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INTRODUCTION
The cigaret industry Is one of the most unique Industries in the
American economy. The chief product of the industry 'Cigaret' is a
popular item of consumption among many people in America and throughout
the world. For instance, in 1966, American people consumed 516.4
1
billion cigarets. Cigarets account for 1.3 percent of all expendi-
2
tures for non-durable goods. Cigarets drew $194,079>300 on net and
spot television in 1966, making the category the fourth highest tele-
3
vision advertising customer. It is apparent that the figure for
1966, will be exceeded in 1967.
Because of the financial contribution to the economy and because
of the social and public attention focussed on cigarets, it will be a
rewarding experience to study some aspects of the operations of the
industry. The present study will concentrate on the market structure
and the pricing practices and policies of the industry. Marketing
1
Marketing Insight. "Cigaret brands proliferate as marketers lean
toward longer, more exotic versions", October 9, 1967., p. 22.
2
Adams, Walter. The Structure of American Industry. New York:
The MacMillan Company, I96I., p. 357.
3
Marketing I ns i ght. "Despite Critics and possible ad. ban, Cigaret
Makers hike T.V. Spending", October 16, 1967, p.8.
1
2
structure in a particular industry depends in significant respects
upon the techniques of competition among the participating firms in
k
the industry. So, this paper will be dealing mostly with the
competitive tools, such as price policies, advertising and the
resultant behavior of the industry.
Also to be included in this paper are the methods the industry
is using to meet the challenges of the various campaigns against the
consumption of cigarets, the influence of market structure and price
policy on the consumption of and demand for cigarets. Some attempts
will be made to find facts about such pertinent questions as (a) Can
the cigaret industry continue to survive all the anti-smoking attacks and
campaigns and make profits? (b) How serious are the Governments
regulations through the various tax systems? (c) What is the trend
of present cigaret consumption?
The main sources of materials are from these recently published
studies which include information on cigarette industry,
(a) The structure of American Industry by Walter Adams.
(b) Economics of American Industry, by Alderfer and Michl.
(c) The American Cigarette Company by Richard B. Tennant.
(d) Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry by William Nicholls.
Ti —
Harvard Business School. "The matter of Procter and Gamble".
EA-R 375, p. 2A.
3
This paper Is written In the following order. Chapter one
deals with the demand and consumption of cigarettes through the
various periods In the history of the Industry. The same chapter
deals with the market structure of the cigarette Industry and the
relative behavior of the Industry. Chapter two deals with the price
practice and policies of the Industry and relates the behavior of the
Industry and consumers to the demand functions of price policies.
The various forms of competitive methods are dealt with In this
chapter. Chapter three Is analysis of the relationship between
the Industry market structure and the price policies and the effect
of these on the demand and consumption of cigarettes. The last
chapter (chapter four) deals with the future of the cigarette
Industry, summary and conclusions.
CHAPTER I
DEMAND AND CONSUMPTION OF Cl CARETS.
The demand and consumption of cigarets have been on the increase
from year to year. Unlike many products, cigarets have many charac¬
teristics which make its demand and consumption inelastic. Based on
past experience, cigaret sales are virtually depression resistant.
Changes in disposable income have some effects on cigaret consumption,
but other factors, including the difficulty of breaking the habit, the
increasing population and the relatively small unit costs, have combined
1
to sustain consumption during periods of economic unsettlement.
The cigaret industry experienced moderate growth during the
past decade. The percentage gains in sales generally exceeded that
in population as a result of principally favourable shift in the age
composition of the population and of the increase in the number of
2
women smokers. People between the ages of 18 and 50 are more now
in the population of the United States. It is among these ages that
the highest per capita consumption of cigarets are found. The number
3
of these age groups will continue to increase for the next twenty years.
1







Table one shows the consumption of tobacco products according to
specified population group. While population factors will continue
favourable, any gains in cigaret consumption in the future may be
1
more in line with increase in population. Label warnings, the
industry advertising codes, higher prices, and anti-smoking
campaigns point to less growth in per capita consumption in the smoking
2
age groups. Domestic cigaret consumption in 1965 rose 2.8 percent
to 511.5 billion units, reaching a new high slightly in excess of
the 1963 total, which was before the January I96A Surgeon General's
3
Report on smoking and health. A new all time record is predicted
for 1967. The united States Department of Agriculture estimated
that 551 billion cigarets will be smoked in 1967 ““ 10 billion more
k
than were smoked in I966.
The Surgeon General's report mentioned above, condemned
cigaret smoking as causative factor in a number of diseases,
notably lung cancer. These conclusions based on statistical com¬
parisons, caused the first decline in the usage of cigarets in a
decade during I96A, but its effects were apparently over within
5




































T9S5 4262 143.9 9.35 2765 2.33 0.24 11.55
154.4 9.20 2.72 2.53 0.26 iT755
1963 4345 124.6 9.70 2.39 2.33 0.27 HTtB
1962 52^5 121.9
i
“9^9 2756 2.34 O.2B iT36
1961 4266 122.9 ”135 2753 2.43 0.29 12.00
i960 4T72 124.7; 9.64 2752 2.43 0,30 iTT^I
1959 4073 124.9 9.54 2.55 2.51 0.2^ 11.73
1958 3953 117.3 9.46 z755 2.60 0.31 11.73
1957 3755 113.0 9.21 2.37 2.56 0.32 11.44
1956 3650 110.8 9.35 2751 2.66 0.34 11.65
1955 3597 112.8 ”9759 2T66 2.91 0.35 11.99
*=Consumption per capita, 18 years and over. T=Consumption per male, 18 years and over.
Source: Standard & Poore's Industry Survey. (April 21, 1966, Section 2) p. 64.
7
Increases in twenty two states. Table two, showing taxpaid withdrawals,
which also represent the amount of cigarets smoked over the past decade,
1955 to 1965, show the steady increase in cigaret consumption with ex¬
ception of I96A.
With the increase in sales of cigarets also came waves of anti¬
smoking campaigns. The release of the Surgeon General's report in I96A,
was followed by such requirements on the part of cigaret makers to put
a health warning on packages. Regulations on advertising was postponed
until 1969. The industry's own regulations prohibit advertising In
media reaching young persons, (this is causing a decline in the use of
Radio for cigaret advertising. More will be said on this under adver¬
tising in Chapter two) barred health claims, endorsement by celebrities
1
and use of persons under 25 in advertising.
A series of subsequent reports differing little from the original
2
ones have been released by Government or private agencies. Starting
In 1966, such reports have been promoting low tar and nicotine brands
as an alternative to non-smoking. Both absolutely and on a per capita
3
basis, cigarette consumption has increased. Since the smoking -
health report of 1962, the position of the British Government has become










BETWEEN 1955 AND 1966
IN BILLIONS OF CIGARETTES

















commercials favourable to smoking. Still 117.7 billion cigarettes
2
were consumed in United Kingdom in 1966, against 109.9 billion in 1962.
In 1966, when anti-smoking efforts were at their zenith, consumption
3
rose 5.1 percent. Coupon promotions, new brands introduced and
price among super markets were more important to consumers than the
absence of a large portion of normal advertising and presence of a
k
considerable amount of anti-smoking potentials. Because of increase
in the smoking age groups, the nature of cigaret demand and the intro¬
duction of new brands, moderate growth in domestic demand for cigarets










ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR CIGARETS:
The various elasticities of demand for cigarettes presents an
interesting study. As a product, cigaret offers little or nothing
of economic value to the user. The satisfaction derived from cigarets
is basically psychic and its continued use is based on the habit¬
forming powers that become a part of its users. Cigarets do not fall
into a luxury class because the cost for them is very small in relation
to most luxury products. So, its use is available to all segments of
the economy.
Cigarets are only one of the forms in which tobacco may be used.
Other forms in which tobacco may be used are pipe smoking, chewing
tobacco, cigars and snuff. Table one shows the various amount of the
tobacco products consumed by specified age groups. Nevertheless, in
the past thirty years, the consumption of cigarets have grown from 3.^
percent to about 88 percent while consumption of other tobacco products
2
has not grown as fast as that of cigarets.
Although the preference for factory made cigarettes is high in
relation to other tobacco products, substitution may be made with cigars,
3
pipe, chewing of rol1-your-own cigarettes. These tobacco products'
1
Richard B. Tennant. The American Cigarette Industry. (New Haven,




Rol1-your-own cigarettes are those made with smoking tobacco which
are rolled into cigarette paper by the user.
n
share the highest degree of interproduct competition with cigarettes.
There have been substitutability in the use of cigarettes through
1
various stages in the history of the cigarette industry.
Anti-smoking campaigns which raised public hostility against
cigarettes, caused laws to be passed prohibiting the sale, possession
of cigarettes, and forced cigarette smokers to use other tobacco
2
products. At many occasions, cigarette smokers switched to other
3
tobacco products when taxes on cigarettes were raised precipitiously.
Much substitution also occured during the depression. At that time,
prices of the regular brands had been raised to a new high and personal
4
income was on the decline. Smokers at this time had the advantage of
interbrand substitution as well as Interproduct substitution. The 10
cents cigarettes made interproduct substitution possible in that they
appealed to those whose incomes had been reduced. From this it can be
concluded that the demand for cigaret per se is not inelastic. In the
period of stable income, there is relatively little sensitivity in
demand for cigarettes. In the early stages of the cigarette industry,
price changes had definite effect upon cigaret consumption. In the
1960's the factors which made cigarette demand respond to price changes
5
have not been in evidence. One reason for this is that the growth in
1








cigarette consumption has not been concentrated in cheap grades. Much
larger tax increases than those in l890s have not been able to check
the increase in consumption, and the higher level of prices which now
1
obtain any given absolute change is proportionately smaller.
On price elasticity on cigarets, Mr. Tennant concluded that;
'It is probably still true that very large change in
cigaret prices would affect consumption patterns but
in the area of observed prices for the past 35 years
elasticity of demand is low. There are factors other
than income and price level which may affect the elas"
ticity of demand for cigarets. A case is recent asso¬
ciation of prevelance of lung cancer to cigaret
consumption.2
Harry M. Wootten's annual studies on cigaret consumptions
showed that sales on regular brands of cigarets dropped considerably in
3
1953. The interchangabi1ity of products is reflected in the change of
a large percentage of the smoking population to filter-tip and king size
cigarettes which claimed to have reduced susceptabi1ity of contracting
it
cancer due to their length or the filter used.
For the individual brands, the sales are more variable than for
the total cigarettes. According to Teannant, brand sales were subjected
1
Tennant. 0£. Ci t. p.litS.
2
Tennant. 0g_. Cit. p.lit5.
3
Harry M. Wootten. "In 1953 cigarette sales 2% under 1952".




to violet year to year fluctuations. Harry M. Wootten's studies also
show that sales fluctuate from year to year even though the general trend
1
is up. Each brand is a substitute for another brand and brand
switching is a rather frequent occurence. If brand switching does occur,
it would seem that brand sales would be highly sensitive to prices.
Such sensitivity should cause a great increase in brand sales of a given
brand, if prices are cut. However, there are other factors which in short
run, make brand sales insensitive to prices. The factors may be brand
2
loyalty and advertising appeal.
On the whole, Tennant's conclusion on factors responsible for
cigarette demand is that:
"Cigarette consumption depends primarily on long run
tastes and trends in national income.^
The above quotation helps to prove what has been mentioned earlier in this
chapter. Demand is insensitive to moderate price changes when disposable
income and national income are increasing from year to year. Demand be¬
comes sensitive to prices usually dgring business depression when purchas¬
ing power is low. Such happened during the depression of the early
thirties. What happened at that time helps to illustrate that although
the demand for cigarets is generally conceded to be inelastic, the market
is not entirely insenstitive to price changes. This is demonstrated by
1
Harry M. Wooten, "Cigarette sales increase 4.5^ over 1951.




Tennant. Cit. p. 173.
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the advent of the 10-cents clgaret during the early thirties.
"In the middle of 1931. when leaf tobacco prices
were declining and consumer purchasing power was
falling by reason of the widening business depress¬
ion, the 'Big three' clgaret companies raised the
wholesale price of cigarettes from $6.40 to $6.85
a thousand. The error of this pricing policy was
subsequently appreciated because it opened the way
for the 10-cents packages of cigarettes. By 1939.
the 10-cent brands had seized almost 12 percent
of the total business".
The reason for the switch from the high grade tobacco to the 10-cent
brands was because of the decline In national income which subsequently
affected disposable income.
Table four helps to illustrate the implication of the lohg taste
as mentioned above. The table shows the percentage that Federal, State,
and local taxes are of total expenditures for tobacco products. As cigarette
comprises the largest item of tobacco products, it can also be assumed that
greater proportion of the tax went to clgaret consumption.
By examining table four, it can be seen that over the fourteen
year period, 1939 to 1952, that excise taxes average 43 percent of the
expenditures for tobacco products. The ability of the commodity to support
a tax of this proportion and to show no decrease in consumption in the long
run, indicates that cigarettes have inelastic demand. It can also be seen
that the consumption of cigarettes in the long run is inelastic from the
proportion of total expenditures represented by excise taxes.
1
Alderfer, E.B. Economics of American Industry. (New York, 1950) p. 635.
TABLE 3
EXCISE TAXES AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION
EXPENDITURES FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
FEDERAL STATE AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
YEAR TAXES LOCAL TAXES TAXES FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS PERCENT
1939 593 182 775 1773 44
19A0 645 200 ,845 rsTs 45
1941 213 961 2073 46
1942 859 212 1071 2329 46
1943 990 212 1202 2579 47
1944 925 215 rr4o 2567 44
1945 1034 231 1266 2930 43
1946 1219 271 1490 43
1947 1267 324 1591 3874 41
1948 1312 36B rsHo 4147 41
1949 1320 413 1733 4266 41
1950 iT45 4^9 1817 4409 41
1951
■
l4V6 503 1949 41
1952 1662 578 2240 5200 43




939“1950 U.S. Department of Commerce: National Income and
in the United States. 1939"1950 Supplement to Survey of
Business. (Washington, 1951) pp. 15^, 192-193.
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TABLE ii
HOW THE IMPORTANT GI CARET PRODUCERS SPLIT
THE MARKET -UNITED SALES
(IN BILLION OF Cl CARETS)







1965 1964 1965 1964 1965 1964 1966 1964
167A 165.5 30.5 52.5 --- — 116.9 113.0
2 American Tobacco 136.3 126.4 29.2 31.0 70“ 13.4 32.2 22.0
3 Brown &
Wi 11iamson 68.0 58.9 2.9 2.8 4.1 3.8 61.0 52.3
4 Philip Morris 54.1 2.0 2.4 3.6 3.8 48.5 42.5
5 P. Lori 1 lard he.7 47.7 .5 • 8 1.0 1.6 45.2 45.3
6 Ligget & Myers 42.9 “50 6.1 7.0 9.3 10.0 27.5 31.6
7 A11 Others : 2.0 1.6 - /.2 .3 .6 .4 1.2 .9
8 Total 517.4 497.4 91.4 96.8 93.5 33.0 332.5 307.6
Major Brands only. Minor brands included in "all other" category. Inclusion would not
alter positions.
Source: Business Week. (December 11, 1965) p. ^8
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THE MARKET STRUCTURES
The present cigaret industry is a descendant of the American
Tobacco Trust. The Trust was the outgrowth of the American Tobacco
1
Company which was organized by James B. Duke in I89O. This company
was a merger of five smoking companies. They were Allen & Ginter of
Richmond, Virginia, Wiliiam S. Kimball and Co. of Rochester, New York,
Kinney Tobacco.Company, Goodwin and Company from New york, and W. Duke
2
Sons and Co.
The Trust was regarded with hostility by tobacco farmers, by
distributors, by the public at large, and by competitors whom it su-
pressed. In 1911, the Supreme Court held the American Tobacco Company
and all its subsidiaries and affiliates to be in violation of the Sherman
3
Act. A subsequent circuit court decree divided the assets and business
k
among some sixteen successor companies.
The basic structure of the cigaret industry has remained prac¬
tically the same since the dissolution of the Trust with one exception.
With the past two decades, P. Lorriiard has lost its position to Philip
Morris, a relatively new comer into the industry. Another reasonable
producer of recent years is Brown 6 Williamson. The remainder of the
cigaret business is spread among numerous producers.
1 ~~
Walter Adam. 0£. Cit. p. 358.
^Ibid.
3





The cigaret Industry is oligopolistic. It is composed of com¬
peting firms producing perfect substitute products in which there are
several large firms which individually produce enought of the total out¬
put to affect the market and the behavior of its competitors.
Joe S. Bain, in his "Price Theory", said that the cigaret industry
is a complex form of oligopoly because a few sellers control a significant
proportion of the industry output and the remainder of the industry output
is supplied by a number of small firms with very small individual shares of
this output. The industry could be said to be an "oligopoly" with a compet-
3
itive fringe. Joe S. Bain also gave two reasons for oligopoly in an industry;
(a) A few firms secure a dominant position in the industry from
the date of its origin and protect this position against the
inroads of established potential competitors.
(b) If the industry has been atomistic in structure (composed
of many firms) that a few firms later secure and retain control
of a dominant share of the market.^
The reasons apply to the cigaret industry. The industry is
oligopolistic due to the size of the firms emerging out of the Tobacco
Trust. The major companies in the industry with the exception of perhaps
Philip Morris and Brown & Williamson, are the original successor companies
I
who have retained control of their dominant positions.
The basic characteristic of oligopoly is 'fewness'. Oligopoly exists
whenever a few firms dominate the market for a product.
McCornell, Campbell R. Economics Principles, Problems and Policies.
New York: p. 396. . “ .
2




Joe S. Bain. 0£. Cit. p.270.
19
The cigaret industry has shown a high concentration of output and
marked similarities of competitive technoiogy and policies. The principal
factors responsible have been the technology of cigaret manufacture and the
nature of cigaret demand. The demand for all tobacco products taken together
is highly inelastic. Ever since the first discovery of the weed, tobacco
has been a favorite object of taxation and of state or private monopoly
because of the heavy charges which it can bear without appreciably diminish-
1
ing consumption. The urgency of the wants which tobacco satisfies, the
small cost of relatively expensive tobacco and the complete lack of sub-
stitures make the volume of tobacco consumption independent of price over
2
a wide rante. Between 1900 and 1958 the consumption of tobacco in the form
of cigarets rose from 3*^ percent to 88 percent of total tobacco consump-
3
tion. Yet it appears that in any short period of time, very little
substitution takes place in response to economic incentive. According
to
Richard B. Tennant,
"Changes in tobacco usage appear to be carried along a broad
social current of fashion and taste and do not seem to be
greatly influenced either by relative price of tobacco products
or by advertising activity. In the long run, the consumption
of cigaret is almost wholly insensitive to changes in prices or
in advertising pressures with the range of changes which can be
observed. Although demand for all tobacco products is inelastic,
the demand for individual brands of cigarets is highly elastic
in its response to price.
1








PRICE PRACTICES AND POLICIES
The cigaret industry more than any other, has passed on to the
consumer benefits of increasing efficiency resulting from the more com-
1
plete mechanization of production. To some extent, the industry avoided
raising prices to offset higher costs during the past decade. Prices had
been unchanged from 1957 through early 1963 when wholesale prices of king-
size and regular-size non-filter brands were raised $0.10 a thousand and
2
$0.35 a thousand respectively. In April 1965. Lori Hard increased the
3
wholesale price of its filter cigarets by $0.35 per thousand. The raise
did not hold when neither American nor Reynolds went along with it. In
early 1966, American posted an increase of $0.A0 per thousand for both
filter and non-filter, but it too, did not hold as other companies did not
join. Consumers paid an average of 30 cents per pack of 20 cigarets in
1965 of which 51.^ percent represented Federal and State excise taxes, com¬
pared with 28.2 cents in I96A of which A9.8 percent represented Federal
k
and State excise taxes. Twenty two states increased excise taxes in 1965.
All the increases in costs did not induce the industry to increase their
1









prices. The manufacturers used other methods to delay price increase.
One method used was the reduction of tobacco contents in cigarettes.
Since 1953, when 2.9 pounds of tobacco leaf was needed to make 1,000
cigarets, leaf requirements declined in each year through 1964, when
1
2.2 pounds was required.
This primarily reflects the increased popularity of filter
brands. The filter plug reduced the tobacco content required. The
2
use of reconstituted leaf is more feasible in filter cigarets.
In an oligopolistic industry like cigaret industry, pricing is
of vital importance to the firms in the industry. At first glance, one
might suspect that price-output determination similar to that of a pure
monopoly would be applicable to an oligopolistic firm. The only difference
might be that the oligopolist's sales curve would be somewhat more elas¬
tic, because he is plagued by a few close substitute goods, while the pure
monopolist faces no good substitutes at all. Marginal cost and marginal
revenue comparisons would then determine the profit maximizing output
and the unique price at which this output could be sold. But it is very
difficult to explain the price-output policies using the formal economic
3
theory. This is because oligopoly encompasses many specific market




Reconstituted leaf or tobacco is obtained by combining the small tobacco
scrap with certain fibers in the whole leaf. The mixture is rolled into
sheets, cut and shredded exactly as are whole strips of leaf tobacco.
3
McConnell, C.R. Cit. pp. 506-508.
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Such situations work against the development of a single, generalized
explanation or model of how an oligopoly determines price and output.
Pure competition, monopolistic competition and pure monopoly all refer
to rather clear-cut market arrangments; oligopoly does not. Another
reason why price-output cannot be easily determined as in the economic
model is because of element of mutual interdependence which fewness adds
to the analysis. That is, the inability of a firm to predict with cer¬
tainty the reactions of its rivals makes it virtually limpossible to esti¬
mate the demand and marginal revenue data faced by an oligopolist. And
with such data, firms cannot determine their profit maximizing price and
2
output even in theory. Despite these analytical difficulties, two
interrelated characteristics of oligopolistic pricing stand out. Oligo¬
polistic prices tend to be infiexible and also price changes less fre¬
quently in oligopoly than they do under pure competition, monopolistic
3
competition and in some instances, pure monopoly. These are so because
any price change made by any of the participating firms in the oligopoly,
is certain to be met or matched by its competitors. So, in the cigaret
industry an oligopolistic policy is pursued. The mechanism used by
industry to adapt the price to changing market conditions is price
leadership. Mr. Fritz Machlup sets up four types of price leadership:
(a) The followers are very small producers who have no
choice of price . . . (b) The followers have a choice




McConnell, C.R. Op. Cit. p. 508.
^bid.
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but not all by raiding prices above the level set by the
leaders, and might gain some business by lowering prices
below that level, yet in spite of the attractiveness of
underselling the leader, they must refrain from doing so
or invite punishments through smashing price raids, costly
patent law suits or other harassing tactics.
(c) The followers have the choices as in type (b), but refrain
from underseiling the leader, not from fear of punishment
by the iatter, but because they expect that the leader would
turn around and accept the lead of the competitors and meet
his lowered price. This would all but nullify the effect
of the move of the far-once-1eading 'followers' and would turn
a smart, profitable move into a stupid and costly one.
(d) The followers have the choice of price, but having learned
that independent pricing allows the buyers to play off one
seller against the other, resulting .in the generally lower
prices and is, in the long run, less lucrative than con¬
certed action, they have secretely or tactily agreed to
proceed in union, letting the stronger member of the
industry act as leader of the concert.^
For the cigaret industry at least, the conditions (a) and (b) are
ruled out. Conditions (c) existed in the period between 1913 and 1919, but
proved unprofitable. Since 1923, there has been for the most part, con¬
certed price, with Reynolds and American Tobacco Company struggling for
the position of price leadership.
Between 1913 and 1919, the list prices of cigarets of various
companies increased from $3.90 to $8.20 with first one company and then
another initiating the price increase. The list price of the respective
brands of each company fluctuated in that at times the brands had the
1




same price, at times they were lower than the other two. it is clearly
evident following the discussion in this paper, that in the years imme¬
diately following the dissolution, the trend in pricing was upward and
that the producers tended to watch each other's pricing policies.
Between 1920 and 1923. there was an era of price reduction which
was brought about because there was a large inventory of leaf tobacco
which had to be used. American Tobacco Company initiated the drop by
2
reducing the price from $8.00 to $7*75. Reynolds followed by reducing
Camels to $7.50. Several other cuts were made until 1923 when prices
for Camels, Chesterfields, and Lucky Strike became $6.AO, $6.A0, and
$6.As respectively. Net prices were $2.6A5, $2.6A5 and $2,689 respec-
3
tively. Many practices were used in this period to avoid outward price
competition. Some of these devices were "drop shipment" special deals,
A
secret discounts and advertising allowances. By 1923, these devices
were no longer in use. The industry entered a period of entirely ident¬
ical prices, discounts and net prices. The chief competitive weapon of
the industry at this time became nation-wide advertising and concentra-
5
ted promotion of one brand.
1
Nicholls, William. Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry.
(Nashville: The Vanderbilt University Press, 1951), pp. 53"5A.
2
Nichol 1s.Cit. p. 52.






The revolution in the cigaret industry brought by Camel and
the First World War, was completed in all essentials by 1920. The
leading brands were established, old brands were obsolete or obso¬
lescent, premiums and coupons were abolished, and national adverti¬
sing was adopted as the principal competitive weapon, and essential
identity of prices among the leading brands was established. Reynolds
1
assumed the role of price leader.
From 1923 to 1931, the industry followed a pattern of olgo-
polistic pricing because identical list prices were maintained for the
2
leading brands. The pricing policies of the cigarette industry since
1939 have fluctuated less than they did in the earlier period. The
second world war had considerable effect on the industry in that price
controls were put on products. There was no need for price competition
in the industry at this time because the demand for any firm's products
was greater than the supply. The effect of the price control was to
3
keep down inflation.
After the heavy demand and shortages of the Second World War,
the big three, American Tobacco Company, Reynolds and Lori Hard,
dominated the industry. Basically, the same policies of non-price
competition and vigorous sales promotion were followed just as after
1




Tennant. Og^. Ci t. p. 87.
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1923. William Nicholl Summarized the situation between 1939 and 1950
as follows:
The years 1939^1950 brought three types of aberration
from cigarette price policies which had become almost
traditional for the major successor companies since 1923.
First, new firms attempted to assume the role upward
as price leader. Secondly, for the first time since
1923, price increase initiated by one of the successor
companies were twice unsuccessful, in that the major
companies refused to follow. Finally, for the first
time since 1929, there were slight departures from ab¬
solute list and net prices identity among successor
companies of major cigaret brands.^
Also Richard B. Tennant made the following comments about the price
policies in the cigaret industry.
"In this industry with its few large firms and high
degree of interbrand elasticity, identical retail
prices are indicated even in the absence of collusion.
The lack of dealers' ability to influence brand sales
make wholesale price concessions unprofitable, while
unusual exactions from distributors run unnecessary
risks for differential. Neither at retail nor at
wholesale does there seem a place for price compe¬
tition among the major companies.^
From the studies of the industry the trend in pricing policies
has gone from price competition to an era of non-price competition
and heavy advertising expenditures.
1
Nicholis, William. Og^. C i t. p. 162.
2
Tennant. Ojg. Ci t. p. k.
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COMPETITION AND OTHER INDUSTRY BEHAVIORS;
A low degree of brand loyalty among cigaret smokers makes for
1
extremely competitive conditions with the industry. This is evident
from the shifts in market positions among the industry leaders over the
past several years. Success usually depends upon broad and intensive
advertising coverage, as well as innovations in packaging and design.
The health question played a greater role in spurring demands for filters.
This Is illustrated by Kent (Lori Hard and Meyers) volume which gained
2
sharply in 196A, although the sales volume dropped 12.8 percent in 1985.
As table five indicates, there has been a proliferation of new
brands in recent years. Increasing competition and results have varied
from brand to brand.
More attempts will be made to make cigarette smoking safer in
the future. According to an article in Marketing Insight, the following
new moves were made recently.
"The waves of new entries into the cigarette field
September (1967) demonstrated anew the impact on
cigarette marketers of the health vs. smoking con-
traversy. Having converted regular brands into filter,
regular, menthol and charcoal — the industry this year
pushed into the 100mm lengths and now appears poised
on the edge of more exotic ventures.
1
Standard and Poore's Industry Surveys. (April 21, 1966) pp. 66-67.
Ibid.
TABLE 5
NEW Cl CARET BRANDS BY THE SIX MAJOR COMPANIES










Half 6 Half 1964 1.0 2.30
Montclai r 19^2 0.2 lM
' Carlton 1.5 .90
Lucky Strike Filter 0.15 5.10
Pall Mall Filter [965 1.30 1.30
2. Brown & Williamson
Belair 1959 0.1 7.78
Kool Filter 1957 6.6 2071
L i fe 1959 0.7 0.18
3. Ligget S Myers
Oas i s 1957 0.9 0.35
Duke 1959 1.0 0.07
Lark 1963 m 5720
4. Lorillard
Newport 1957 0.9 8.70
York 1961 0.2 0.45
Spring I960 0.7 1.56
5. Phil ip Morris
Paxton 1963 2.0 1.60
Phi 1 ip Morris FiIter 1964 2.95 4.65
6. Reynolds Tobacco
Brandon 1962 0.2 0.12
Tempo 1964 2.0 2.0
Camel 1965 Test Market
1
Source: Standard 6 Poorei. 0£. CIt. (April 21, 1966, Section 2), p. 66.
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American Tobacco Company last month introduced a thinner
cigaret. Silver Thin, while P. Lorillard came out with a
no-name brand. Ligget & Myers entered a 101mm cigaret and
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation delivered a 99 fnni
cigaret.
The cigaret industry continues to see sales rise--1966 was
8.6 percent ahead of 1965 as Americans smoked 516.^ billion
cigarets compared with 512 billion in 1965. Although non¬
filter brands dropped to 163.1 from 179*^ billion the
previous year, increased filter brands smoking led to the
record filter sales. Sales rose to 353*3 billion, led by
the plain filter brands (15 of them) totalling 223.8 billion
cigarets." 1
The basic characteristics of cigarette demand give important
market advantage to the large firms. It is possible to compete either
through price cutting or through advertising and both methods have been
used at one time or another. If prices were cut to gain business, as
was the frequent practices under the Trust, it forces other firms to
follow suit if they are not to lose a large portion of their business.
This means that no firm in cigarette industry can expect to gain cus¬
tomers by price cutting without inviting retaliation.
8ut if prices are cut until all companies are losing money, it
is the largest and strongest which can hold out and endure losses until
the small firms go under.
On the other hand, when competition is conducted through adver¬
tising, its effectiveness depends largely on the amount spent in promoting
1
"Cigaret brands proliferate as marketers lean toward longer, more exotic
versions". Marketing Insight. (October 9. 196?)
2
Walter Adams. 0£. Cit. p. 372.
a given brand. Skillful salesmanship may allow one company to achieve
the same results as another with only half the expenditure, for the
persuasiveness of the advertising depends as much on the sales message
as on the loudness with which it is shouted. Where advertising abili¬
ties are evenly distributed, the larger expenditures win, and it is
1
the big company which can afford these outlays. Another advantage to
large companies arises from the requirements for distribution. With
thousands of wholesalers and a million and half retail outlets, and
with heavy dependence of cigarets purchases upon convenient access, the
maintainance of complete distribution requires expensive field sales
activities. The major companies each employ many hundreds of salesmen
to visit wholesalers and retailers for order taking, stock supervision,
points of sales display and other promotions. The expense of such
activities are borne more easily by large companies. A smali producer
can avoid some of these distributions, but this will reduce his market
2
opportunities. For these reasons the output of the Cigaret Industry
is concentrated.
The concentrated structure of the industry and the peculiar¬
ities of cigarette demand have a profound influence upon the industry
behaviour. When firms are large, they need not accept the going market
price and demand conditions as something given outside their own
control. Each firm must set its own policy in the knowledge that its
31
action will affect the industry as a whole and two entirely different
types of behavior are possible. Policy may be directed either to
eliminate weaker competitor by outright warfare or to ensure maximum
profits on the assumption that all firms will survive. Price and ad¬
vertising policies provide adequate tools for either task, and at var¬
ious times in history ends have been pursued and both tools have been
1
used.
When Duke (organizer of the Trust Company) was a power in the
industry, competitive measures were directed to injuring competitors,
so that they would either abandon business or agree to join forces.
Usually extreme pressure by price cutting and advertising were com¬
bined with relatively generous offers to buy. After the dissolution
of the Trust, competitive strategy was directed to increase profits
rather than injuring competitors. It was then possible neither to
eliminate competitors, nor to join them and the major successor
companies were forced to adopot their policies to a situation in which
each others' continued existence and independence must be taken for
2
granted. In these circumstances, price cutting has serious disad¬
vantages as competitive weapons. An individual oligopolistic firm's
control over price tends to be closely circumscribed by the mutual






lowers prices, it will initially gain sales at the expense of its
several rivals. However, these adversely affected rivals will have
little choice but to retailiate to recover their shrinking shares
of the market. They will watch or even undercut the given firm
to preserve their market share. The result may be a price war and
1
possible losses for all firms.
It will be cheaper to use advertising as competitive tool
than prices. Even though competitive advertising may increase
advertising outlays, the increase will be very negligible when
applied to the unit sales or the sales volume that will result.
Competitive advertising campaigns designed to change the division
of the market will undoubtedly lead to increased sales.
The disadvantages of using retail price competitive tool
do not appear so strongly in the case of wholesale prices. Cigarets
are normally sold to jobbers at a price set by the manufacturers,
while the prices at which jobbers resell to retailers and the latter
resell to the public are set by competition among distributors,
modified by occasional collusive agreement. Thus, while the major
firms strive to maintain identical retail prices, it is possible
that one of them may seek the good will of jobbers and retailers
by shaving his net prices. Prices may be used to an advantage in
1
McConnell. 0£. Cit. p. 397.
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introducing new brands. A new brand and untried brand is not equiv¬
alent to an established brand in the eyes of the consumer. His
willingness to try a new brand may not be influenced by a low price
or prevented by a high price. But a new brand may be effectively
promoted with prices which are below or above established brand
without other competitors coming in. Once a brand is well know and
accepted in a given class, interbrand elasticity becomes higher and
1
uniformity of prices within the class is certain to be established.
Interbrand elasticity means that when different brands are well known,
there may be a tendency on the part of the consumer to switch from
one brand to another. The demand for a specific brand at this point
rests upon the conviction of the superiority of that brand. This
depends not only upon quality, but also upon what advertisers can
2
make the consumer believe.
In the normal competitive situation in the twenties and
thirties when the major brands had achieved maturity and when all
were selling comparable volumes, the major manufacturers were con¬
tent to set identical wholesale prices, to strive through auction
market to pay approximately the same price for leaf tobacco, and to
devote the difference between these two principal elements to
3
receipt and costs to advertising outlays.
1
Adams, Walter. 0£. Cit. pp. 37^"375.
2
Adams, Walter. Og^. Cit. p. 375.
3
Adams, Walter. 0g_. Cit. p. 376.
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Apart from new product introduction and the price war of 1933,
price has seldom been used as a competitive tool. The absence of
price competition does not necessarily imply collusion by the man¬
ufacturers. The possible interests which each might have in cutting
prices lower than the others is eliminated by certain knowledge that
the others will follow any cut that net effect will be to the detri-
1
ment of all without profit for any.
In any event, the companies are concerned with increasing the
individual share of the market rather than maximizing the profits of
the industry as a whole. This attitude has led to the firms in the
2
industry to make much larger advertising expendures.
The industry is unlike a monopoly because there are still
chances for competition. The rise of Philip Morris and Brown &
Williamson to their present status helps to prove this fact. The
firms in the industry can compete with one another by using increased
advertising and product innovations. The proliferation of filter tip
cigarets and other lengths and the reduction of tar and nicotine and
the introduction of 100mm cigarettes also help to explain that the
firms can compete with those tools effectively. None of them will
1






gain control over prices once their individual brands are well es¬
tablished, for the consumers can now determine which brands to buy
and not to buy. Price behavior, as has been pointed out earlier in
this chapter, once brands are well established, would not be very
different and so no firm will be able to control his prices as a
monopolist will do when his brands have been well known in the market.
ADVERTISING;
The First World War was the occasion for the first major spurt
in cigarette consumption because soldiers were freely supplied with this
form of tobacco. It was not until that period that cigarette smoking ac¬
quired widespread social respectability. Persistent advertising helped to
spread the habit. In the late twenties the potential market was vastly
increased when cigarette companies ventured the suggestion of cigarette
1
smoking by women. Advertising was enormously used to achieve this end.
The cigarette industry demonstrates better than any other, the
power of advertising to create a market and the necessity of advertising
to maintain that market. Heavy appropriations for advertising, more
than anything else, explain the sixfold increase in consumption within
the short period of three decades. The individual companies have dis¬
covered through experience that their sales are highly dependent upon
T~
Alderfer, E.B. Economics of American Industry. (New York: 1950).
pp. 633-3^.
36
advertising. Whenever appropriations are curtailed, it is reflected
almost immediately in reduced sales. The demand for a specific brand
rests upon the conviction of the superiority of that brand. This
depends not only on quality, but also upon what the advertisers can
1
make the consumers believe.
Advertising costs, the largest to tobacco, constitute one of
the prime means available to the cigarette Industry of maintaining
and expanding the market for what is essentially a low brand loyalty
item. An increase in the number of brands, types, and sizes has
compounded the task. Spending for advertising has more than doubled
since 1955. Advertising costs per carton in 196A were at $0.16, versus
$0.59 in 1955. The cost per carton varied widely from an established
low of $0.3^ for Camel to a high of $l.Al for Tempo,a new brand. In
the few years, incentive compensation system for agencies, a relative
increase in spot Television advertising, use of 'family concept' under
which several types of cigarets are offered under the same brand name,
introduction of premium brands with little advertising and 'piggy
backing' of television commercials, have been used to hold down the
2
increase of advertising costs.
Although many attempts have been made to hold down the costs




Standard & Poore's. 0£^. Cit. pp. 67-68.
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could be seen from table six. For some of the companies like
American Tobacco Company and R.J. Reynolds, the cost of advertising
has almost doubled between I960 and 1964. Also, despite critics
and possible broadcast advertising ban, cigaret makers hike televi
sion spending from year to year as can be seen from tabie six and the
following figures from Marketing Insight, which read as follows:
The six major tobacco companies spent $122,470,300
in the first half of this year (1967) on spot and net¬
work television, compared with $89,903,470 in the
opening six months of 1966. That is an increase of
36.2 percent.^
From the present trend in advertising policies of the major
cigaret companies, it can be seen that television advertising will
continue to increase.
According to one knowledgeabie tobacco source who asked not
to be identified, he said that
"Unless the Federal Government intervenes to prohibit
cigaret advertising on television, there is doubt if
any tobacco company will change their advertising
schedules drastically".^
Another tobacco official also said that he sees no cut in television ad¬
vertising in the immediate future. Among other things he added:
"I am sure it is going to be up, simply because costs are
up. I see no trend to cut television advertising".3
1
Market Insight. "Despite critics and possible broadcast ad
ban, cigaret makers like TV spending". October 16, 1967- p. 8.
2
Marketing Insight. Op. Cit. p. 8
^I bid.
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One major factor for the increase in television spending has
been the recent introduction of perhaps a score of 100mm brands.
The only noticeable decline in advertising is on spot and network
radio spending. During the first six months of 1987, the spending
on spot and network radio declined by 18.8 percent from $16,092,000
1
to $13,022,000. The cutback can be attributed to the thinking
that radio now reaches a greater teen age audience, which cigaret
makers want to steer away from. Table seven gives detailed figures
on television and radio cigaret advertising for the first six months
of 1967 versus 1966.
INVENTORY VALUES AND POLICY:
No industry has so a proportion of assets tied up in inven¬
tories as the cigarette industry. "Inventory accounts for 80 percent
2
of the total assets of the leading companies in 19^8. The reason
is that the raw tobacco has to be aged for at least 18 months. The
companies generally follow the policy of carrying two to four years
supply of tobacco. This enables a manufacturer to curtail raw material
purchases in any one year if he regards prices as too high or if the
quality is inferior. This buying and inventory policies of the










FOR THE SIX LEADING CIGARET MAKERS
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
TTJMPANIES —rgOT“—rsFT—rw TO"
—
American Tobacco 36,000 36,000 46,000 55,200 70,500
Brown 6 Wi111amson 31,000 27,000 25,000 33,000 36,000
Ligget & Myers 36,000 28,500 29,500 34,000 35,000
Lori 1 lard 31,000 31^500 36,500 / 37,000 36,000
Philip Morris 29,000 30,000 30,000 35,000. 36,000
R.J. Reynolds 47,000 50,000 55,000 58,000 84,000
Source: Standard 6 Poore's Industry Surveys. (April 21, 1966) p. 68
TABLE 7
Cl CARET ADVERTISING-TV & RADIO
FIRST 6 MONTHS. 1967 Vs. 1966




R.J. Reynolds $ 22,659.200 $20,356,590 + 11.3
American Tobacco 21 .A36.700 19,778,750 + 8.4
Philip Morris 18,260.200 10,910,050 +67.4
P. Lorillard 15,178.600 11,117,^10 --
Ligget & Myers 1^,709.500 13.507,120 +36.5
Brown & Williamson 1^,^70,300 1^,232,550 + 3.4
TOTAL $122,^70,300 $89,903,470 - +36,2




R.J. Reynolds $ 5.178.000 $ 5,978.000 -13.3
American Tobacco 3.052,000 4.745,000 -36.6
Phi 1 ip Morris --- ---
P. Lorillard 3.179,000 3.161,000 +40.6
Ligget & Myers 1.595.000 ! 2.143,000 -24.8
Brown & Wi11iamson 18,000 000LA -72.3
TOTAL $13,022,000 $16,092,000 -18.8
Source: TV. B Figures from leading National advertisers -
Rorabaugh; Radio Advertising Bureau
k]
According to E.B. Alderfer, he noted that
Relations between the 1,602,000 tobacco growers and the
cigarete makers are not entirely satisfactory. Since most
of the annual crop domestically consumed is bought by a
handful of companies, the farmers feel that the big com¬
panies conspire to keep prices down. Dissatisfaction on
the part of the growers usually arises from the system
of marketing leaf tobacco. Most tobacco is sold through
auction warehouse systems. When the sales start, the
auctioneer proceeds from one basket to another to the
highest bidder until the floor is cleared.^
This auction system is very inefficient because the buyers are
the manufacturers or their representatives, exporters, dealers and
speculators. Sales are made very rapidly. This is disadvantageous to
the farmers because buyers have to make a hasty appraisal and to protect
themselves, they offer less than the tobacco should bring. Another un¬
satisfactory feature is the short marketing period in each tobacco
growing area. If the farmer does not offer his tobacco before the large
buyers have withdrawn their support, he must have to take what he can get
later on or incure the risk and expense of sending his crop to a distant
market.
Although the Federal Trade Commission has found no evidence of
collusion among buyers, the tobacco marketing system has many earmarks of
2
a buyers' market. This is because sellers are numerous, small and
impecunious; buyers are few, large and financially strong. The market
is often glutted because tobacco is an ideal tennant farmer crop; it
Alderfer. 0£. Cit. pp. 635*636.
^Alderfer, 0£_. Cit. p. 637.
?bid.
k2
requires little capital but much labor to raise. The farmers are
ever in urgent need of whatever cash their crop will bring. The man¬
ufacturers are seldom in urgent need of tobacco because they usually
1
have a huge stock in the warehouses to fall back on. The fact that
the manufacturers are in no urgent need of tobacco makes the prices
that the farmers get, based on what the cigaret makers are ready to
pay. That is why the tobacco marketing system is said to have many
earmarks of a buyers' market.
PROFIT MARGINS;
This branch of the tobacco industry (cigarette industry) has
been unusually profitable. From the dissolution of the Trust to 1930,
the "Big Three"; American Tobacco Company, Reynolds and Lori Hard,
2
earned consistently 10 percent, and over on their invested capitals,
with Philip Morris taking the place of Lorillard, the earning capacity
of the leaders continued substantially unimpaired through the
depression years of the thirties. As has been noted, the sustained
earning power of the cigarette companies is rooted in the nature of





Alderfer, Og^. Cit. p. 632.
TABLE 8
PROFIT MARGIN OF LEADING COMPANIES 1938-19^8*
(OPERATING INCOME BEFORE DEPRECIATION AS A
PERCENTAGE OF SALES. EXCLUDING EXCISE TAXES)





Lor 11 lard Reynolds Philip
Morris
1938 23.9 21.5 14.8 22.4 27.7
1939 23.1 22.0 14.0 25.0 27.9
19^0 27.9 23.4 14.7 26.3 26.6
19^*1 28.9 23.4 14.7 27.1 31.0
19^2 28.5 24.6 16.9 25.1 23.4
19^3 24.8 ' 23.1 15.6 25.9 15.0
]Skk 18.0 17.5 16.7 18.9 15.0
19^5 16.5 14.4 13.7 16.8 9.8
1946 15.9 15.8 10.6 16.6 11.8
1947 15.9 16.3 14.4 17.9 12.2
1948 18.9 18.9 13.5 18.0
Alderfer. Og^. C i t. p. 635.
TABLE 9
RIStNG LEAF, WAGES AND ADVERTISING COSTS AND
INCREASING NON-TOBACCO ACT IV IT IES ^|XERTED PRESSURE
^ ON MARGINS IN RECENT YEARS.









Myers .or i 11 ard
Philip
Morris Reynolds
1965 — 22.8 23.6 15.6 20.2 13.0 29.1
I96A 15.9 22.9 11.1 19.2 20.8 12.8 29.3
1963 15.7 2A.3 2O 19.5 22.5 1A.2 31.5
15.2 2h.h 22.9 20.5 21 .2 15.2 3O
T9FI 1^.7 2O 23.5 21.5 HA 15.1 33.5.
T9S0 1^.7 23.5 20.5 22.0 23.4 15.3 30.2
1959 15.3 23.6 21 .6 22.2 23.5 17.3 29.5
1958 i4.A 23.2 21.7 23. s 23.5 16.2 2O
1957 15.8 rrs 21.3 22.5 18.2 15.9 25.9
1956 15.3 22.2 20.9 21.5 11.2 15.3 2Fr5
1955 15.9 22.2 2175 21.2 12.3 18.7 27.8
*
Source: Standard & Poore's: Industry Surveys (April 21, 1966) P. T. 7^.
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PUBLIC POLICY:
Public policy as far as business is concerned, deals with
how business must operate according to the regulations or controls
established by the Government. Business in the United States is
affected in many ways by the activities of government. It is
government that provides the institutional foundation upon which
business rests, the legal framework within which it functions, and
many of the instruments through which its activities are carried




By 'business' in this context, is meant that part of economic activity
that has to do with the production, distribution and sale of goods and
services.^
'Public' means some agencies of government. The general public influences
business through channels other than those of government through buying
or failing to buy its products through force of public opinion, but this
paper is concerned with control through government.^
The meaning of 'Contol' in this paper is confined to the deliberate
adoption by goverment of measures designed to cause the policies of
business to differ, in material aspects, from those that they would
voluntarily pursue. So, the common feature of control is modification
of the behavior of business in response to pressure applies through
government.^
Wilcox, Clair. Public Policies Toward Business. (Swarthmore
College, I96O) p. 3.
2Wi1 cox, Clair. 0£. Cit. p. 4.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
The purposes for which government applies controls to bus¬
iness are as follows:
The maintainance of internal order, such as defense against
external aggression, preservation of individual freedom,
reduction of inequality of income, assurance of economic
and social security and improvement of consumer welfare.'
Government has sought by the above purposes to maintain
competition. It has preserved freedom of entry into markets, forbid¬
den agreements to curtail production or fix prices, broken up existing
combinations and prevented the formation of new ones, and outlawed
competitive methods that would destroy competition and make for monopoly.
To this end, it established standards, forbidden adulteration and mis¬
representation, required publicity, inspected business operations and
2
regulated organized exchanges,.. These steps were taken to maintain
the above mentioned purposes which constitute public policies. It was
the section dealing mostly with competition, price fixing, monopolizing
and the improvement of consumer welfare, that the cigaret makers vio¬
lated and charges were brought against them.
I would rather mention a few of public policy abuses by the
cigaret industry than discuss them in full. The American Tobacco Trust
case in 1911 and the American Tobacco Company case of 19^6 were the two
court cases involving the industry. In the Trust case, abuses were
charged on the grounds that the Trust sought to monopolize the tobacco
47
industry through unfair methods and that its size brought no economies
which would benefit the public.
The Trust was dissolved under the provisions of the Sherman
Act. The 1946 case sought to prove that collusion and conspiracy
existed among the major firms thereby monopolizing the industry
among a few firms. The major firms were found guilty,but no con¬
structive measures were taken to regulate their future operations.
Many people have suggested that the cigaret industry be broken
up into smaller firms to reduce the oligopolistic nature of the indus¬
try. From the discussion in this paper, it could be concluded that no
other system will work better than the present one. There are still
chances for competition among the participating firms, even the small
ones. The products of rival manufacturers, although similar, are not
identical in the public eye, and cannot be made so. The firms cannot
merely sell at the going prices all that they wish, but must fight for
markets and this is the function of a brand name, advertising and
other methods of distribution. Since perfect competition cannot exist
in the industry, all possibly alternative forms of market structure
which might be set up in place of the present oligopolistic method
must contain some other kind or degree of monopolistic element. The
present organization and behavior of the cigaret industry appears
favourable when compared with possible alternative market structure or
alternative types of behavior. Perfect competition is not attainable.
A full monopoly would offer doubtful savings and other overwhelming
1*8
drawbacks. Monopolistic competition or looser oliogopoly would
probably result in increased costs. The major wastes of the industry
are wastes of competition and they could not be removed without
eliminating competition or seriously restricting it. If competition
is accepted as desirable in itself, people must accept costs and
there are no obvious guides as to how much competition is too much
or how much cost is excessive.
CHAPTER I I I
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDUSTRY MARKET STRUCTURE
AND THE PRICE POLICIES
From the many points raised, It could be seen that there is a
great demand for cigarettes which is for the most part psychic and partly
based on habit. The increased popularity of the product has caused it to
become the most important product among the tobacco products. It could
also be seen that there are many factors influencing the demand and con¬
sumption of cigarettes. Though the industry is heavily taxed, and pro¬
duction costs increased, sales and profits continue on the increase year
after year. That shows that high prices do not deter consumption as It
does in some other products. The demand for cigarettes is such that in
periods of stable income, there is relatively little sensitivity in the
area of reasonable price increase. The urgency of the wants which
tobacco satisfies, the small cost even of relatively expensive tobacco
and the complete lack of substitutes make the volume of tobacco (cigaret)
consumption independent of prices over a wide range. Changes in tobacco
usage appear to be carried along on broad social currents of fashion and
taste, and do not seem to be greatly influenced either by relative price
of tobacco products or by advertising activities.
Based on these reasons. Government restrictions through excise
taxes and prohibitions of intensive advertising may not be very effec¬
tive in reducing cigarette consumption. Where such restrictions would
50
work at all, Is because of the existence of Irrational brand
preferences. The existence of such Irrational brand preferences
renders demand highly susceptible to advertising. The shifting for¬
tunes of the leading brands within the same product type reflect both
autonomous fluctuation In tastes and the varying pressure of adver¬
tising.
From all the Indications In the market operations of the Industry,
consumption will continue to rise Irrespective of the type of pricing
policies adopted by the companies or the restrictive methods and attacks
by the government and some private agencies. The ultimate effect of the
cancer problem Is difficult to judge. The charges have so far produced
only a temporary dip In cigarette consumption and It will take major con¬
firming evidence and long exposure to the lesson for consumption to be
seriously affected. Without additional evidence. It Is unlikely that
existing smokers will reduce consumption substantially. Some threat to
the Industry Is posed by the likelihood that fewer non-smokers will be
converted. The multiplication of so-called "safe brands" by the various
companies will become a permanent feature of the Industry. This might
tempt new Intrants to go on large scale cigarette consumption.
WHY ARE THE MAJOR PRODUCERS DIVERSIFYING?
The major cigaret makers are not resting on their oars because
present sales are on the Increase. There are fears In the minds of the
manufacturers that the antl-smoklng campaigns may hurt their future sales
51
and income, hence many are diversifying. More will be said about diver¬
sification in the next chapter dealing with the future of the cigaret
industry. The fears of the cigaret makers may be reasonable or justified
because according to a study on brand comparisons conducted by television
1
advertising representatives during March and May, 1967. anti**cigaret
drive, may be influencing usage. The detail of the report reads as
follows:
The arguments against cigaret smoking, in the form of
government regulations, as well as persuasion by private
agencies, may finally be having an effect. The ninth
annual Television Advertising Representative's study
covered consumption and brand usage of 370 products in
12 categories during March and May, 1967, among some
5,000 families in eight markets where Television
Representatives represent television stations; Boston,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Charlotte,
Jacksonville, Pittsburgh and San^Francisco. Unlike the
survey which showed smoking increases in five of eight
markets, increases occurred in only three markets
during 1967 researched period. In the remaining five
survey markets, cigaret smoking declined.
The largest decline was registered in Boston, where the
study indicated 51•I percent of the men surveyed were
cigaret smokers, compared with 5^.7 percent during the
same period of 1966. Smokjng among women also fell off
heaviest in Boston (43.9 percent in 1967 vs. 46.0
percent in 1966). Cigaret smoking also declined in
Philadelphia (55.5 percent in 1966 vs. 53.0 percent
in 1967), Washington (53.4 percent in I966 vs. 51.1
percent in 1967), Jacksonville (56.7 percent vs. 53.7
percent), and San Francisco (52.7 percent vs. 51.0
percent).
1
Marketing Insight. "Anti-cigaret drive may be influencing
usage". (November 27, 1967) p. 8
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In addition to Boston, womenre smoking less in
Philadelphia (42.2 percent in 1966 against 40.8
percent in 1967), Washington (40.8 percent vs. 39.4),
Charlotte (36.4 percent vs. 33.8 percent), and
San Francisco (40.2 percent vs. 39*6 percent).'
Baltimore, Charlotte and Pittsburgh were the three
markets which saw an increase in cigaret smoking
among men with the largest percent in Charlotte, the
heart of the tobacco country. The survey indicated a
1967 figure of 57.2 percent, compared with 53.9 percent
last year (I966). Also showing increases were
Baltimore (56.3 percent vs. 53.2 percent in 1966),
and Pittsburgh (50.6 percent against 48.3 percent in 1966).
Increases for women in I967 showed Baltimore (44.5 percent
vs. 41.8 percent), Jacksonville (36.3 percent vs. 35.1 2
percent), and Pittsburgh (34.7 percent vs. 30.9 percent).
Despite the declines in the various sectors of the country,
cigaret sales are on the increase generally. According to the United
States Department of Agriculture, smokers will burn record number of
cigarets in 1967. The report goes like this:
The department of Agriculture estimates that U.S. snx>kers
will consume a record 551 billion cigarets this year (1967)
-- 10 billion more than were smoked in I966. The total
United States cigarets manufactured in 1967 is expected to
reach an all time of 589 billion. This nearly 13 billion
more than 1966 output and approximately 12 billion above
the 1965 levei.
The number of cigarets consumed per capita, 18 years and
over, in 1967, will reach an estimated 4,295 or 213 3/4
packs. This per capita total would be slightly above the
1966 figure, but it is not a record. The record was set
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A further moderate Increase in total cigaret consumption
in 1968 seems likely, mainly because of the continuing
increase in the smoking-age population and the high level
of consumer income.^
1
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CHAPTER IV
THE FUTURE OF THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY
It Is now noticeable that the cigarette industry is moving
towards other industries. This is because there is difference of
opinion as to the future trend of cigaret consumption. As of present,
the industry is enjoying increase in sales. Though there is ever
mounting anti-smoking campaigns which could have led to decline in the
demand and sales of the product, such did not happen. As has been
pointed out earlier, cigarettes have a number of advantages over other
types of consumer goods. Customers are habitual users, renewing their
purchases several times a week. The unit of purchase is small, about
30 cents. The product is available everywhere. It is estimated that
there are about 600,000 retail outlets in the United States.
Despite these obvious advantages, the manufacturers are not
inclined on waiting to see something serious happen to their industry
before taking necessary precautionary and security measures. That
is why many of the cigaret manufacturers are diversifying. The trend
toward diversifying started by Philip Morris, accelerated in recent
years, particularly in I966 and I967, when liquor, food, and candy
companies were the main forms of new diversification.
Philip Morris acquired Milprint, Inc., a converter of flexible
packaging materials and Polymer Industries, producers of chemical
adhesives and textile additives In 1957 and 1958 respectively.
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Subsequent acquisitions were American Safety Razor Company, a line of
shaving cream and mens' toiletries, and Clark Gum Company. Including
International cigarette revenues, a third of this company's volume is
from sources other than U.S. cigarettes.
R.J. Reynolds maintains an alluminum foil rolling and process¬
ing plant. In I963 it acquired Pacific Hawiian Product Company, a
producer of non-carbonated fruit juice beverages, and in I965, Penich
and Ford, the fourth largest producer of corn products, filler products
(snack food) and Chun King Corporation (packaged and frozen Chinese-
American food) in I967. Approximately 11% of total revenue is now
derived from non-cigaret business.
American Tobacco acquired Sunshine Biscuits and Beam Distilling
and is in the process of acquiring Buckingham and Paddington Corpora¬
tion (Cutty Sark Scotch Whisky) which would lift non-cigarette sales
to perhaps 28% of the total sales. Efforts to acquire Royal Crown
Cola were unsuccessful.
Liggett and Myers in 1964 acquired Allen Products, maker of
Alpo dog food; in I966 about 80% of Star Industries and Paddington
Corporation (related firms whose main product is J & B Scotch Whisky)
were acquired. Over one fourth of sales is from non-tobacco products.
In 1964 Lori Hard acquired Usen Canning Company, maker of
Tabby and Three Kittens cat foods. It also entered the candy field
through acquisition in I965. Pending acquisition of Schenly Industry
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(1lquor)wpuld probably lift Lorillard's present small non-cigarette
business to about half of total sales.
All the above moves have in common a desire to make greater use
of the considerable marketing skills of the cigaret industry and to
create safety valves in case the numerous campaigns against cigaret
smoking begins to hurt sales and profitability in the industry. As
has been noted earlier in this paper, more attempts will be made to
make cigaret smoking safer. As campaigns and attacks mount, it should
be expected that marketers should be on the edge of more exotic
1
ventures to meet the challenges.
The attempts by cigaret makers to make smoking safer also means
that more research will be done. The cost of these researches adds to
the production costs of cigarets. The various federal, state and local
taxes also add to the present increasing production costs of cigarets.
Some of the costs will be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher
prices for cigarets. Such moderate increases of prices of cigarets do
not deter increase in sales or smoking of cigarets as they do in other
industries. Despite increase in prices to the consumers, cigaret sales
volumes continue to create new records from year to year. Even though
cigaret makers are diversifying to hedge against possible future loss
in cigaret sales, they will continue with their present pricing policy
which is moderate price increase and not shifting all the tax burden
to the consumers.
1 ■
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION;
The cigaret industry is blessed with a product with peculiar
apfieal. Unlike other products, cigaret has quite distinctive charac¬
teristics that have sustained the earning power of the industry.
Smoking easily becomes habitual, which assures a steady demand. Based
on past experience, cigaret sales are virtually depression resistant.
Although changes in <1 isposable income have some effect as could be
noticted during the depression of 1930s and other periods when price of
cigarets increased, but other factors including the difficulty of
breadking the habit, the increasing population and the relatively
small unit costs, have combined to sustain consumption during periods
of economic unsettlement.
By market structure, the cigaret industry is oligopolistic,
(a few firms dominating the production of cigaret and the action of one
of the big few firms can affect the whole market for cigaret). As
discussed in chapter one, market structure in any particular industry
depeneds in significant respects upon the techniques of competition
among the participating firms in the industry. But apart from the
competition between the participating firms in the industry, it can be
said that there is another form of competition. This second form is
rather external in that it comes from government and anti-smoking agencies.
No industry has faced such competition to survive as the cigaret
industry. Anti-smoking campaigns are directed by such agencies as
American Cancer Society, Government and some other private agencies, to
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discourage smoking. According to the Surgeon General's findings in
1964, it is believed that cigaret smoking causes lung cancer and some
other related diseases.
To counteract whatever effect anti-smoking campaigns may have
on cigaret sales, the cigaret makers have devised certain methods of
improving cigaret smoking. Some of the methods are (a) The introduc¬
tion of filter tip cigarets, (b) reduction of tar and nicotine contents
in cigarets, and (c) making cigarets longer and milder. Also to assure
a steady income in the future at present levels or better, many of the
cigaret makers are diversifying. They have gone mostly into food and
drink Industries, where their marketing experiences in cigaret industry
would be very beneficial.
it has been common knowledge that the demand for all tobacco
products taken together is highly inelastic. Since the first discovery
of the weed, tobacco has been a favorite object of taxation and of
state and private monopoly because of the heavy charges which it bears
without appreciably diminishing consumption. The urgency of the wants
which tobacco satisfies and the complete lack of substitutes make the
volumes of tobacco consumption independent of prices. It is the unique
nature of the tobacco products (cigaret being one of them) that has
made the industry adopt moderate price Increase policy. Such policy
will continue in the future and such will not decrease consumption
because tobacco product has no substitutes, hence the product
consumption will continue to be Inelastic.
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Oligopolistic pricing will continue to dominate the industry
because it is only through that and concerted pricing policies can
the firms in the industry maximize their profits.
Advertising outlays will continue to be heavily appropriated
because of the competitive nature between the individual brands of
cigarets. This is also because new and safer cigarets will, from
time to time, be introduced to the market in asnwer to anti-smoking
campaigns. Such introductions demand heavy advertising outlays.
From the present trend in advertising, it could be predicted that
radio will be used less for cigaret promotion and that the television
will be the dominant medium of advertising. There is impending
speculation that television advertising of cigarets will be stopped
in the future. This may not pose a very grave danger to cigaret
consumption and sales. This conclusion is based on what has been
happening in Britain in recent years. The British Government stopped
all television promotion of cigaret and more than anybody, has imposed
very strict measures and anti-smoking campaigns. All these stringent
measures have not reduced the volume of cigarets smoked in Britain or
changed the attitudes of the smokers there.
From all the above, it could be said that the cigaret industry
is in no immediate danger of reduced sales. But to assure continued,
steady income and to counteract the various antl-smoking campaigns,
the industry will continue in the attempt to produce safer cigarets and
to diversify Into such Industries where the experiences In cigaret
marketing will be of great help.
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